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It has become a common claim that the gravest dangers to world security are no 
longer military threats from rival great powers, but rather transnational threats 
emanating from poorly governed countries.  
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become increas-
ingly preoccupied with the phenomenon usually named “state failure”, because 
state failure causes a wide range of humanitarian, legal, and security problems. 
Recent examples of failed states are familiar to all of us, from the total collapse 
of state institutions in Somalia and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia 
to the varied crises in Rwanda, Haiti, Liberia, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Af-
ghanistan. But how can we measure or define if a state is a “weak” or a “failed” 
state? 
Due to the importance gained by this issue, several international organizations 
(World Bank, The Fund for Peace) and national institutions (U.S. National 
Security and the Commission on Weak States, United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development) performed several surveys in this respect. This 
paper aims to identify and to analyze the ways to measure state failure and con-
cludes with commentaries drawn on a contrasting perspective of three most re-
nowned attempts (e.g. the Transformational Index of the Bertelsmann Founda-
tion, the Governance Index of the World Bank, and the Failed States Index of 
the Foreign Policy Council). The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
114 
Keywords: failed states, security, development 
JEL Classification: F52, O19 
 
1. The concept of “failed states”  
 
There is a growing recognition of the threat to international security 
posed by failed and fragile states, often marred by serious internal con-
flict that also has the potential of destabilising neighbouring states and 
providing ungoverned territory that can provide safe haven for terror-
ists. The inability of their governments to provide basic services is 
considered a significant contributory factor. Poorly performing devel-
oping countries are linked to humanitarian catastrophes; mass migra-
tion; environmental degradation; regional instability; energy insecurity; 
global pandemics; international crime; the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and, of course, transnational terrorism. 
Academics  and  policy-makers  have  been  interested  in  state  failure 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The concept of state failure was 
popularised by Madeleine Albright and others at the United Nations in 
the early 1990s (Gross, 1996), although the political scientist Robert 
H. Jackson was writing about a similar topic – under the label of ‘qua-
sistates’ – even before 1990 (Jackson, 1987).  
Other important early works on state failure include Helman and Rat-
ner’s “Saving Failed States”, which was published in 1993 in Foreign Policy 
and argued for UN conservatorship in failed states (Helman and Rat-
ner, 1993), and Kaplan’s influential 1994 Atlantic Monthly article, “The 
Coming  Anarchy”,  which  described  state  failure  in  West  Africa  and 
darkly predicted that it would spread throughout the world (Kaplan, 
1994).  
Zartman’s (1995) edited work “Collapsed States” is the earliest book de-
voted entirely to state failure & collapse, while Gross (1996) attempted 
to construct a ‘taxonomy’ of failed states in 1996, placing them in five 
categories: ‘anarchic’, ‘phantom’, ‘anaemic’, ‘captured’, and ‘aborted’. The Romanian Economic Journal 
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More recently, Baranyi and Powell (2005) argue that “conceptions of 
state fragility, weakness and failure converge around two ideas”. First, 
fragility refers to certain states’ inability and/or unwillingness to pro-
vide essential public goods like protection from external threats, rule 
of law and basic social services to most of their citizens. Second, fra-
gility is a matter of degree - ranging from states that have ceased to ex-
ist in all but name and cannot provide protection or welfare to anyone, 
to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most of their 
citizens. 
Despite the large body of scholarly writings on the subject, there is 
no agreement on the definition of state failure. The most widely 
accepted definition is that offered by Zartman (1995), who defines 
failure as occurring when “the basic functions of the state are no 
longer performed”.  
Patrick (2006) considers that “state strength is a relative concept and 
can be measured by the state’s ability and willingness to provide the 
fundamental political goods associated with statehood: physical security, 
legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare”. Many 
countries have critical gaps in one or more of these four areas of gov-
ernance. In effect, they possess legal but not actual sovereignty. In the 
security realm, they struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of 
force, control borders and territory, ensure public order, and provide 
safety from crime. In the economic arena, they strain to carry out ba-
sic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or establish a legal and regula-
tory climate conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, open 
trade,  natural  resource  management,  foreign  investment,  and  eco-
nomic growth. In the political sphere, they lack legitimate governing 
institutions  that  provide  effective  administration,  ensure  checks  on 
power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, 
deliver impartial justice, and permit broad citizen participation. Finally, 
in the social domain, they fail to meet the basic needs of their popula-
tions by making even minimal investments in health, education, and 
other social services. The Romanian Economic Journal 
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Leading thinkers such as Fukuyama (2002) have said that, “since the 
end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the 
single-most important problem for international order.” In Washing-
ton, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice declared that nations incapa-
ble of exercising “responsible sovereignty” have a “spill-over effect in 
the  form  of  terrorism,  weapons  proliferation,  and  other  dangers” 
(quoted by Garfinkle, 2003). 
In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit has advo-
cated  a  government-wide  approach  to  stabilizing  fragile  countries 
(PMSU,  2005),  and  Canada  and  Australia  are  following  suit.  The 
United Nations has been similarly engaged; the unifying theme of one 
series of proposals for the UN reform was the need for effective sov-
ereign states to deal with today’s global security agenda. Kofi Annan 
remarked before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in 
2004 that, “whether the threat is terror or AIDS, a threat to one is a 
threat to all.… Our defences are only as strong as their weakest link.” 
(Annan, 2004) 
Recent studies were conducted by Patrick (2006), Krasner and Pascual 
(2003), Clemens and Moss (2005), François and Sud (2006), Malek 
(2006) and others. All agree that state failure causes a wide range of 
humanitarian, legal, and security problems. 
Among the international agencies / bodies involved in the creation 
of a strategy applicable to failed states we can mention: the World 
Bank, USAID, the OECD DAC, AusAID, DFID, and selected UN 
agencies. Most of these agencies/bodies are leaders in the community 
of donors working on fragile states, and all have strong policies re-
garding failed states. Many studies were conducted by specialists from 
these organisations. 
The report of the US-government-commissioned State Failure Task 
Force, one of the most extensive studies of state failure, links state 
failure to widespread internal conflict that further destabilises an al-
ready shaky regime (State Failure Task Force, 2000). It may be argued The Romanian Economic Journal 
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that weak or failed states provide opportunities for actors outside the 
government – whether religious fundamentalists, disaffected citizens, 
or merely opportunists seeking power – to attempt to seize the state 
apparatus by violent means. According to the State Failure Task Force 
(2000), the internal conflict can take various forms: 
•  Revolutionary wars. Episodes of sustained violent conflict be-
tween  governments  and  politically  organised  challengers  that 
seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, 
or to seize power in one region. 
•  Ethnic wars. Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which 
national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities chal-
lenge governments to seek major changes in status. 
•  Adverse regime changes. Major abrupt shifts in patterns of 
governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or 
regime instability, and shifts away from democracy towards au-
thoritarian rule. 
•  Genocides  and  politicides.  Sustained  policies  by  states  or 
their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending au-
thorities,  that  result  in  deaths  of  a  substantial  portion  of  a 
communal or political group. 
Recently, Malek (2006) considers useful to assume the existence of the 
state monopoly over all of the national territory a central factor of a 
state’s effectiveness. In an effective state, there are neither separatist 
parts nor any areas “liberated” by rebels or regions constantly con-
trolled by guerillas, warlords, and neighbouring countries, etc. “The 
division of a country’s territory is clearly indicating the failure of a 
state – in contrast to categories like its legitimacy in the view of the 
population, the effectiveness of institutions, bureaucracy, corruption, 
and the functioning of the legal system, etc.” (Malek, 2006). As those 
are mainly subject to individual perception and bound to various tradi-The Romanian Economic Journal 
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tions and customs, they are much more difficult to be operationalized 
and assessed. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of strong and weak or failed states (Malek, 
2006) 
Characteristic  Strong state  Weak / failed state 
State monopoly on use 
of force  exists  more or less absent 
Sovereignty of state  high  low 
Quality of democracy  high  low 
Legitimacy of state 
and citizens’ loyalty to 
it 
high  low 
Security  high  low 
State control of terri-
tory  exists  more or less absent 
State control of bor-




high  low 
Disposition of means 
of physical violence 
concentrated in the 
hand of the state and 
of persons authorized 
by it 
illegally also in the 
hand of non-state 
players 
Corruption and crime  low  high or out of con-
trol 
Legal order  reliable  unreliable and inef-
fective 
Economy  functioning  in more or less deep 
crisis 
Demographic changes  slight and under con- considerable and out The Romanian Economic Journal 
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Characteristic  Strong state  Weak / failed state 
trol  of control, enormous 
streams of refugees, 
mass emigration 
 
Effects of failed states 
 
In their paper “Promoting Stability and Development in Fragile and 
Failed States” François and Sud (2006) identified a series of effects of 
failed states: 
Domestic effects 
The domestic effects of state failure and collapse are severe. “When 
the state cannot or will not fulfil its core functions, citizens suffer”. 
State collapse is especially devastating, as the total disintegration of 
public authority usually leads to violent contestation over who will 
control the state and obtain the benefits that international recognition 
brings. 
Citizens flee in massive refugee flows. The effects of civil war persist 
for years after the war ends; these include increased mortality rates, 
inflated military spending, capital flight, loss of social capital, and low 
economic growth (World Bank, 2003).  
Neighbourhood effects 
State failure and collapse also have strong regional effects. First, state 
failure itself can be contagious. The civil war that often accompanies 
state failure and collapse can easily spill over into neighbouring coun-
tries, leading to failure in those countries. Civil wars often ‘cluster’, as 
exemplified by Central America in the 1980s and the Balkans and Af-
rican Great Lakes in the 1990s (World Bank, 2003). Secondly, state 
failure has large negative effects on economic growth in neighbouring 
countries. A recent World Bank study estimates that states sharing a 
border with a fragile or failed state – a ‘low-income country under The Romanian Economic Journal 
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stress’ or LICUS in the World Bank’s terminology – have economic 
growth rates that average 1.6 percentage points lower than those in 
states which are not neighbouring (Chauvet and Collier, 2005).  
Finally, another enormous regional cost of state failure is the spread of 
malaria and HIV/AIDS that accompanies refugee flows (World Bank, 
2003). 
Global effects 
As  the  world  becomes  more  and  more  interdependent,  the  global 
threats posed by state failure and collapse increase. When states lose 
control over what goes on within their borders, the result is ‘ungov-
erned spaces’. These lawless areas allow drug production and traffick-
ing, international terrorism, and other global crime to flourish. Co-
ordinated action on the part of the international community is essen-
tial to curb the global risks of failed states. 
 
2.  Defining  and  Identifying  Failed  States:  Problems  of  Meas-
urement 
There  is no  consensus on  the  precise number  of  weak and  failing 
states. According to Patrick (2006), “the Commission on Weak States 
and U.S. National Security estimates that there are between 50 and 60; 
the  United  Kingdom’s  Department  for  International  Development 
classifies 46 nations with 870 million inhabitants as “fragile”; and the 
World Bank treats 30 countries as LICUS
1.” 
The World Bank has identified about 30 “low-income countries under 
stress,” whereas Britain’s Department for International Development 
has named 46 “fragile” states of concern. A report commissioned by 
the CIA has put the number of failing states at about 20. 
These divergent estimates reflect differences in the criteria used 
to define state weakness, the indicators used to gauge it, and the 
                     
1 Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) The Romanian Economic Journal 
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relative weighting of various aspects of governance. The remain-
der of this section will contrast and discuss three of the most reputed 
measurements of the degree of state failure. 
A.  One  of  the  most  comprehensive  and  well-respected  system  for 
evaluating state performance is the World Bank’s “Governance In-
dicators”. The WGI cover 213 countries and territories and are based 
on several hundred variables produced by 25 different sources, includ-
ing commercial data providers. (Kaufmann et al., 2006)  
Since the 1990s, development researchers and practitioners have fo-
cused on “good governance” as both a means of achieving develop-
ment and a development objective in itself. The World Bank has de-
fined  “good  governance”  as  “epitomized  by  predictable,  open  and 
enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional 
ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and 
a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.” (World Bank, 1994)  
In response to the growing demand for measures of the quality of 
governance, a number of aggregate governance indicators have been 
produced, such as the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (“WGI”). 
The WGI rank countries with respect to six aspects of good gov-
ernance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Violence, Govern-
ment Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators 
have been used by researchers as explanatory variables and by United 
States policymakers to allocate enormous aid packages.  
Most recently, the indicators were defined as:  
  1. Voice and Accountability (VA), the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media.  
  2. Political stability and absence of violence (PV), perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by The Romanian Economic Journal 
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unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence or ter-
rorism.  
  3. Government effectiveness (GE), the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from po-
litical pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
  4. Regulatory quality (RQ), the ability of the government to for-
mulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote 
private sector development.  
  5. Rule of law (RL), the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likeli-
hood of crime and violence.  
  6. Control of corruption (CC), the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private inter-
ests.  
The  indicators  are  not  absolute  measures  of  governance,  but  are 
measures of a country’s relative rank with respect to that indicator. 
The indicators have been produced for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 
and 2005 with global coverage, albeit with some missing values. Six 
papers have been written presenting the data sets. Most are published 
as World Bank Working Papers, but one has been published in a peer-
reviewed journal.  
Table 2 lists the 44 countries that rest in the bottom quintile, ranked 
from weakest (Somalia) to strongest (Algeria). 
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Source: Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV, 2005  
From  the  listing  presented  in  Table  2,  we  can  observe  that  weak 
states are not necessarily poor states. Accordingly, the fifth quintile 
includes  several  lower-middle-income  countries,  such  as  Venezuela, 
and excludes a few very poor countries, such as Gambia and Niger. 
This definition of state  weakness differs  from  that adopted by  the 
World Bank and OECD/DAC donors, which restrict the category 
“fragile state” to very poor countries that are eligible for the bank’s 
concessional  (International  Development  Association)  window  and 
that score lowest on the bank’s Country Policy and Institutional As-
sessment indicators. That approach, although consistent with the pov-
erty reduction mandate of aid agencies, is overly restrictive for policy The Romanian Economic Journal 
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analysts and officials interested in the security implications of weak 
governance across the entire range of developing countries. 
B. To present a more precise picture of the scope and implications of 
the problem, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organiza-
tion, and Foreign Policy have conducted a global ranking of weak and 
failing states
1.  
Using  12  social,  economic,  political,  and  military  indicators,  they 
ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal con-
flict. For each indicator, the Fund for Peace computed scores using 
software that analyzed data from tens of thousands of international 
and local media sources from the last half of 2004.  
The resulting index (Failed States Index) provides a profile of the 
new  world  disorder of the  21st  century and demonstrates that  the 
problem of weak and failing states is far more serious than generally 
thought. About 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying 
degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict.  
The indicators used by The Fund of Peace in composing the Failed 
State Index are: 
I.  Social Indicators 
1.  Mounting Democratic Pressures 
2. Massive Movement of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons 
creating Complex Humanitarian Emergencies 
3. Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Para-
noia 
4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight 
II. Economic Indicators 
5. Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines 
                     
1 www.foreignpolicy.com  The Romanian Economic Journal 
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6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline 
III. Political Indicators 
7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State 
8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services 
9.  Suspension  or  Arbitrary  Application  of  the  Rule  of  Law  and 
Widespread Violation of Human Rights 
10. Security Apparatus Operates as a "State Within a State" 
11. Rise of Factionalized Elites 
12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors 
Source: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/  
The FSI was first introduced in the July/August 2005 issue of Foreign 
Policy magazine. In 2005, it rated 75 countries; in 2006, the Index was 
expanded to include 146 countries. The 2007 Failed States Index (FSI) 
ranks 177 countries based on their social, economic, and political pres-
sures. 
C. The Bertelsmann  Transformation Index (BTI)  examines  the 
political management of change on the way to a market-based democ-
racy. To this end, the index provides two rankings and two trend indicators, 
which present the results of the comparative analysis. The Status In-
dex shows the state of development that a country had achieved on 
the way to democracy and a market economy by the beginning of 
2005.  
The  Status  Index’s  overall  result  represents  the  mean  value  of  the 
scores for the dimensions “Political Transformation” and “Economic 
Transformation”. 
The score for ”Political Transformation“ is obtained by calculating the 
mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: 
￿  Stateness  The Romanian Economic Journal 
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￿  Political Participation  
￿  Rule of Law  
￿  Stability of Democratic Institutions  
￿  Political and Social Integration 
The score for ”Economic Transformation“ is obtained by calculating 
the mean value of the ratings for the following criteria: 
￿  Level of Socioeconomic Development  
￿  Organization of the Market and Competition  
￿  Currency and Price Stability  
￿  Private Property  
￿  Welfare Regime  
￿  Economic Performance  
￿  Sustainability 
The  Management  Index  classifies  the  quality  of  transformation 
management in the countries examined between 2003 and 2005. The 
trend indicators provide information on the direction of development 
in terms of democracy and a market economy in each of the countries 
examined from 2001 to 2005. 
The  study  embraces  119  developing  and  transformation  countries 
worldwide. 
The Methodology for the BTI is represented by qualitative assess-
ments by experts. Relying on 58 qualitative & quantitative indicators, 
experts on the country in question have, for each of the 119 countries, 
examined in detail to what extent the total of 19 criteria have been 
met. The BTI methodology has been slightly modified due to experi-
ence gathered in compiling the 2003 BTI and to other suggestions. 
The adjustments have been aimed at improving the BTI, its precision 
and its differentiation, without altering the objectives of the study or The Romanian Economic Journal 
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putting the comparability of the data at risk. With this aim in mind, the 
number of criteria and questions has been slightly reduced. The score 
forming the basis of the two indices is now derived from 58 separate 
questions — not from criteria as in 2003. To differentiate more pre-
cisely between the various countries, the results for the Status Index 
are also shown on a 10-point scale in the 2006 BTI — as opposed to a 
5-point scale as in the 2003 BTI. The trend indicators for democracy 
and a market economy are shown separately in order to more clearly 
illustrate successes and setbacks in development. The level of difficulty 
in the Management Index was calculated with the aid of quantitative 
data. 
Assessment efforts of the presented Indices present common compo-
nents, such as: political and social issues. Still, major differences exist. 
More particularly, The World Bank has developed sets of indicators 
focusing on measuring governance and has created metrics to track 
how well rule of law is being established in transitional societies and to 
identify the quality of life. 
In addition to political indicators, economic indicators are almost all 
the time considered. Relevant approaches to measuring economic fac-
tors can be found both in The Fund of Peace and Bertelsmann as-
sessment methodologies. In addition, The Bertelsmann Transforma-
tion Index assesses the quality of transformation management in the 
examined countries. 
The framework is structured around determining conflict drivers and 
state/society  capacities  across  five  different  “pillars”  of  analysis: 
Politics and Stable Democracy, Security, Rule of Law, Economic Sus-
tainability, and Social Well-Being. Addressing the five pillars of analy-
sis from both conflict drivers and capacity growth perspectives, the 
central judgment is determining the point at which the drivers of con-
flict have been sufficiently reduced and the institutional capacity of the 
state has sufficiently grown that the level of outside assistance can be-
gin to be reduced. The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
128 
All of these metrics approaches have been individually and manually 
crafted over time. Methodologies were continuously adapted and im-
proved. This was done to address some difficulties of measurement, 
and assessment errors. Even the authors of the indicators have tried to 
draw attention to the large standard errors of the estimates – caveats 




This paper aims to create a comprehensive approach to the issue of 
economic development as influenced by the real-world problem of 
state weakness (see Cojanu and Popescu, 2006). Accordingly, it has 
been produced a synthesis of the theories on “failed states” and the 
range of policy ramifications.  
It has been suggested that a set of indices may be used to present a di-
agnosis  of  the  problem,  the  first  step  in  devising  strategies  for 
strengthening weak and failing states. The more reliably policymakers 
can anticipate, monitor, and measure problems, the more they can act 
to prevent violent breakdowns, protect civilians caught in the cross-
fire, and promote recovery. Continuous monitoring of the measures, 
using the same assessment methodology, can inform decision making 
on strategies and programs.  
At the same time, policymakers must focus on building the institu-
tional capacity of weak states, particularly the “core five” institutions: 
military,  police,  civil  service,  the  system  of  justice,  and  leadership. 
These are assessed in different ways by different authors and organiza-
tions. Still, the aim remains more or less the same: building strategies 
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Failed States List (Fund of Peace) 
2007 
177 states were included in the list, of which 32 were classified as 
"alert", 97 as "warning", 33 as "moderate", 15 as "sustainable". The 
worst 20 states are shown below. For the entire ranking see List of 
countries by Failed States Index. Change in rank from 2006 is shown 
in parentheses. 
1. Sudan (0) 
2. Iraq (+2) 
3. Somalia (+4) 
4. Zimbabwe (+1) 
5. Chad (+1) 
6. Côte d'Ivoire (-3) 
7. Congo (-5) 
  8. Afghanistan (+2) 
  9. Guinea (+2) 
10. Central African Repub-
lic (+3) 
11. Haiti (-3) 
12. Pakistan (-3) 
13. North Korea (+1) 
14. Burma/Myanmar (+4) 
15.Uganda (+6)  
16. Bangladesh (+3) 
17. Nigeria (+5) 
18. Ethiopia (+8) 





&id=229&Itemid=366   
 
2006 The Romanian Economic Journal 
 
Year X, no. 25 bis                                                                November 2007 
132 
146 states were included in the 2006 list, of which 28 were classified as 
"alert", 78 as "warning", 27 as "moderate", 13 as "sustainable". The 
worst 20 states are shown below. Change in rank from 2005 is shown 
in parentheses. 
1.Sudan (+2) 
2. Congo (0) 
3. Côte d'Ivoire (-
2) 
4. Iraq (0) 
5. Zimbabwe 
(+10) 
6. Chad (+1) 
7. Somalia (-2) 
  8.Haiti (+2) 
  9. Pakistan (+25)
[21] 
10. Afghanistan (+1) 
11. Guinea (+5) 
12. Liberia (-3) 
13. Central African Re-
public (+7) 
14. North Korea (-1) 
15. Burundi (+3) 
16. Yemen (-8) 
17. Sierra Leone (-11) 
18. Burma/Myanmar 
(+5)  
19. Bangladesh (-2) 
20. Nepal (+15)  
 Source: http://fundforpeace.web.cedant.com/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php    
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